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Intergovernmentalists in the Commision: Foxes in the Henhouse? 
 
Renaud Dehousse and Andrew Thompson
1
 
Abstract 
 
Contrary to the dominant view in the scholarly literature on European institutions, where the 
European Commission is generally described as a unitary actor whose acts are primarily 
influenced by a political agenda and/or considerations of self-interest, this article argues that a 
variety of opinions coexist within the Commission staff. Based on the largest attitudinal 
survey ever conducted on Commission officials, it documents the existence of a sizeable 
minority of intergovernmentalists and analyzes their attitude towards the institution they serve 
and their views on its place in the integration process. 
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If the presence of forces hostile to integration in the European Parliament or 
occasionally in the Council of ministers is not a new phenomenon, as documented in other 
contributions to this special issue, studies of the Commission to date have not brought to the 
fore a similar phenomenon at that level. In the scholarly literature on European institutions, 
the European Commission is generally viewed as an actor whose acts are primarily influenced 
by a vision of the integration process or by considerations of self-interest. Even when its 
powers are limited, it is said to act as a ‘purposeful opportunist’ in order to expand its 
influence (Cram, 1993); it has also been accused of resorting to tactics of policy–making by 
subterfuge (Héritier, 1997) or even of seeking forms of integration by stealth, desired neither 
by the member states of the Union nor by its citizens (Majone, 2005). To some extent at least, 
this can be viewed as a by-product of the original role assigned to that institution, which 
differs in several important respects from that of the secretariats of more classical 
international organizations. As every student of European integration knows, the Commission 
has been endowed with discretionary powers in the field of policy-making and of policy 
enforcement. The treaty invites it to act independently from external pressures; so does its 
official institutional ideology, the ‘Community method’ (CM), designed by the founders of 
the EU (Dehousse, 2011) and to which the Commission leadership systematically pays lip 
service (Barroso, 2011).  
 
 Given its institutional brief, it would seem natural to expect the Commission to behave 
in a unitary fashion in order to serve the ‘general interest’, as required by the European Union 
(EU) Treaty. Neo-functionalists expected it to push steadily in favour of more integration, like 
its forerunner the ECSC High Authority (Haas, 1958). Indeed, it has regularly done so, albeit 
with variable success (see e.g. Drake, 2000). In an earlier study, based on the largest 
attitudinal survey ever conducted on Commission officials, we have documented the existence 
amongst its officials of widespread adhesion to a classic view of the Commission’s role, 
despite the adverse conditions to which it has been exposed since the Maastricht Treaty: Over 
60 per cent of respondents were found to support the idea that the Community method 
remains the best operating code in today’s Union (Dehousse and Thompson, 2012). However, 
it has also been shown that a variety of ‘images of Europe’ coexist within the Commission 
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(Hooghe, 2010). Of course, unlike the Parliament or the Council of ministers, it is not a 
representative body; even nationality concerns can play a role in the selection of its officials. 
The former being mostly recruited through a competitive selection process (concours), one 
would be surprised to discover widespread Euroscepticism, i.e. outright hostility  to European 
integration, amongst them. Yet,. in the course of the above-mentioned study, we were 
surprised to find out that a sizeable number of officials appear to adhere to an alternative view 
of integration, in which the Member states, rather than the Commission are supposed to be  
the key players in the EU policy process.  The presence within the Commission of 
intergovernmentalists (IG), whose views appear to be in direct contrast with the ‘official’ 
creed of the institution, and with the dominant understanding of its role, is per se an 
interesting, counter-intuitive, phenomenon. In this article, we intend to offer a closer analysis 
of this group of Commission officials.  Our goal is twofold: first we want to understand who 
these intergovernmentalists are and what are the elements that influence the worldview they 
defend (section 2); second, we will try to explore in further detail the views they may have on 
the operation of the Commission, on its past and on its future (Section 3). We will also 
discuss the meaning of their presence in the Commission, in a period characterized by an 
overall growth of intergovernmentalism in the Union. Are they to be regarded as potential 
agents of the national governments in the EU executive – foxes in the henhouse? Before doing 
so, however, we will offer a rapid description of the EUCIQ survey, on which our analysis 
rests (section 1). 
 
 
The EUCIQ Survey 
 
The European Commission in Question (EUCIQ) project aimed to develop new knowledge of 
an organisation that has undergone considerable administrative and compositional changes 
over the last few years, subsequent to major reforms of administrative management (the 
Kinnock reforms) and recruitment procedures, and to the 2004 enlargement. The project 
entailed an analysis of its composition, structures and organization, compared with 
developments in public administrations elsewhere.  
 
The study included a set of approaches that are relatively distinctive in the study of the 
European Union.  Firstly, the primary interest was in the Commission as a whole, rather than 
a specific focus on one or two aspects of the organisation.  Although this did not rule out 
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specific analyses on particular topics, it allowed for a more holistic understanding of the 
organisation from the perspective of those who work in it.  Secondly, the disciplinary 
perspective was primarily based on the theories and literature of public administration, rather 
than the hitherto-fore focus of many researchers on the role or influence of the Commission as 
a political actor.  Thirdly, the Commission was looked at in a comparative perspective with 
national bureaucracies, rather than assuming it is unique and of its own making, whilst 
allowing for certain distinctive attributes, such as its role as policy-maker.  Fourthly, one of 
the project’s main features was the attention paid to the people who work in the organisation 
in a policy-related role.  Finally, the project led to the production of a set of primary datasets, 
which allowed analysis of data that have been created to meet the specific objectives of this 
research, rather than having undue reliance on secondary data created for a different purpose. 
 
Given the aim asking identical questions to a range of officials within the Commission, both 
to a representative cross-section of the whole organisation and to specific elite sub-groups, for 
the purposes of generalisation and explanation, surveys were the appropriate research 
strategy.   In order to sample officials across the whole of the Commission, in Brussels and 
Luxembourg, an on-line, self-completion questionnaire was used. This enabled enhancement 
of the reach of the survey and minimised the potential errors of data input and coding, whilst 
offering a convenient and relatively simple format to encourage a high response rate.  Given 
the highly educated workforce use ICT in their everyday activities to communicate, the choice 
of this medium did not appear susceptible to deterring potential respondents from 
participating.  In addition to the advantages listed above, this mode of delivery could be 
facilitated by the Commission through its internal email address list, thus (almost) 
guaranteeing a precise contact point for each survey respondent. 
 
The work in designing the questionnaire was carried out by the research team,
2
 based on 
previous surveys of the Commission and other administrations. The questionnaire included 
sections on respondents’ socio-demographic features, their educational and career 
backgrounds, their attitudes (including political philosophy), and their perceptions of their 
roles with the Commission.  It also contained questions relating to their views on the internal 
operations of the organisation; the roles and relationships between Cabinets, the Secretary 
General and the Directorates General; the effects of enlargement from 15 to 27 member 
states; and the impact of the Kinnock reforms on the efficiency, effectiveness, staff morale 
and general working of the organisation, as well as on their broader views on the 
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Commission’s role in EU policy-making. These questions form the backbone of the analysis 
presented in the remainder of this article. 
 
A decision was made to benefit from the expertise of a commercial internet survey company, 
YouGov, whose clients are typically in the public sector.  This expertise lay in their 
experience of designing on-line surveys and questionnaires, including both the form of the 
measurement instrument and the control parameters of its implementation in the field. The on-
line survey was launched in September 2008 and was open for a period of two months. 
 
Table 1 shows the population, target sample and achieved sample for the on-line survey of all 
Commission officials in the policy-related AD staff in 39 Directorates General, plus members 
of the Cabinets.  It is interesting to note that approximately 40 per cent of each group 
responded, apart from the Cabinet members, for whom the response rate was just over a 
quarter. 
 
Table 1 Population and sample sizes for the on-line survey of Commission officials in 
Brussels and Luxembourg 
 
Sample Group Population 
Size 
Target 
Sample Size 
Achieved Sample Size 
 N n n %* 
Cabinet members     203   203     54 27 
Senior Managers 
(DG/DDG/Directors) 
    270   270   114 42 
Advisers / Assistants 
to Directors General 
    212   212     81 38 
Middle Managers 
(HoU) 
  1081 1081   429 40 
Principal 
Administrators / 
Administrators 
12964 2855 1149 40 
Others / not declared       74  
TOTAL 14,730 4621 1901 41 
*Approximate percentages, excluding ‘others/not declared’ 
 
 The EUCIQ survey has shown that there is still wide support within the Commission for 
a vision of the EU in which it is supposed to be playing a key role, without being hindered too 
much by national governments or the EP. Amongst the respondents there was strong (79   per 
cent) opposition to the idea that the member states’ grip over decision-making should be 
tolerated and, notwithstanding the widespread supremacy of the parliamentary democracy 
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model in Europe, a sizable majority (57.8 per cent) was of the opinion that the European 
Parliament should not be given a right of legislative initiative. When it comes to the 
Commission’s own place in the EU system, the classical view still held firmly. While just 
over half accepted that policy management and coordination occupy a growing place in the 
institution’s task, an overwhelming majority (79.8  per cent, with over 40 per cent holding the 
view strongly) declared themselves opposed to the idea that it should primarily focus on 
managerial duties. Nearly two thirds were even convinced that the Commission’s role as 
policy initiator is gaining more importance as a result of enlargement.  
 
 Altogether, these responses might be read as a confirmation of wide support for the 
old Community method, in which the Commission has to pull the ropes of EU policy-making 
by bridging the gap between the rival interests of national governments and the viewpoints of 
the Council and the Parliament.  However, as indicated above, the survey has also revealed 
the existence within the Commission staff of views that appear to be in direct contrast with 
the majority standpoint. 
 
Who are the Commission Intergovernmentalists? 
 
 Asked who should be the central players in the EU, a number of respondents to the on-
line survey indicated this leadership role belonged to the member states, rather than to the 
Commission or the European Parliament.  This provides a subset of 152 officials (8.2 per 
cent) of the total (weighted)
3
 sample of 1846, which we label Commission 
intergovernmentalists. 
 
 Who are these people and what are the variables that may affect their attitude?  Earlier 
work has shown that officials’ views on EU governance are generally influenced by their 
nationality (Hooghe, 2001). Indeed, this appears to be confirmed by our data, which shows 
there are significant variations from one nationality to the other. Support for the 
intergovernmentalist view is more than twice higher than average among Irish (20 per cent),  
British, Latvians and Slovaks (about 23 per cent each). Within the intergovernmentalist group, 
the British contingent is by far the largest: on their own, British officials account for almost 
one fifth (19.3 per cent) of the that group, whereas they represent only about 5 per cent of the 
total number of Commission officials 
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-- INSERT Figure 1 ABOUT HERE – 
 
 
Some clichés find confirmation in our data : British, Danes and Swedes appear more 
concerned about states’ rights than, say, Italians, Greeks and Belgians. Making sense of these 
differences is difficult. Size does not appear to be a decisive factor: there are large and small 
states among the countries whose officials appear most ‘state minded’, as well as among 
supporters of the Community method. Given the weakness of support for the 
intergovernmentalist view amongst Belgians, Dutch, or (to a lesser degree) Germans, it would 
be far-fetched to speak of a North-South cleavage.  Likewise, it cannot be argued that the 
length of membership in the Union is a decisive factor: Figure 2 shows that successive 
enlargements have had an impact in addition to the first one. Whereas officials from first 
enlargement countries are more likely to show a receptiveness to the intergovernmentalist 
view, the same is not true for their colleagues in Central and Eastern European countries. 
Indeed, contrary to widespread expectations, there is little difference between officials from 
EU 15 countries and their colleagues from EU 12 countries in that respect. 
. 
 
-- Figure 2 about here – 
 
 The importance of nationality factors is highlighted by the relative weak explanatory 
contribution of other variables. Thus, one might have thought that officials’ functions in the 
Commission influence their views on the issue at hand. Yet this does not find a confirmation 
in our data. True, there are differences between directorate-generals (DG). As shown in 
Figure 3,. there are six DGs significantly below the overall mean;  support for 
intergovernmentalism appears three times stronger in the European anti-fraud office (OLAF) 
than in the MARKT directoreate-general (internal market and services).  In general terms, 
intergovernmentalism appears weak in areas where the EU is endowed with clearly 
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established powers of its own, such as competition or trade policies. Yet when one tries to 
group directorate-generals by types of activity that dominate their area (legislative, spending 
or regulatory; internal or external), the differences appear insignificant. Policies may structure 
politics, as Lowi (1972) has argued, but they do not appear to exert a decisive influence on the 
policy views nurtured by Commission officials, though caution is required here due to the 
small sample sizes within each DG. 
 
--Figure 3 about here – 
 
  
Similarly, while seniority shows some interesting variation, the differences are not significant, 
either from the overall mean or from each other, as seen in Figure 4. Length of service shows 
no relationship either. 
  
-- figure 4 about here --  
 
 In order to identify the possible confounding effect of age on seniority and length of 
service, we have analysed the age cohorts in relation to the level of support of 
intergovernmentalism (Figure 5). There is indeed a weak relationship, such that the youngest 
are least likely to be IGs and significantly less likely than the 46-55 age-group
4
 . However, the 
various age groups do not differ significantly from the overall mean, and age provides less 
than 5 per cent explanation 
5
. 
 
 
-- Fig 5 about here -- 
 
 
In line with Liesbet Hooghe’s 2001 findings, we expected those who have worked in a 
national administration prior to joining the EU bureaucracy to find it more difficult to support 
a system characterised by a clear transfer of authority to the supranational level. This found a 
confirmation, although not a particularly strong one,  in our data.  The mean proportions are 
11.0 per cent for intergovernentalism among officials with a prior experience in the national 
public service and and 6.4 per cent for the others, a difference of nearly 5 per cent (95%CI: 
1.8 to 7.3 per cent)
6
. 
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 Finally, turning to the weight of ideas, we tried to map officials’ philosophical beliefs 
by asking them to posit themselves on a 0 to 10 scale along two axes: economic philosophy 
(government v. market) and social-cultural philosophy (liberal v. conservative). As shown in 
Figure 6 and 7, intergovermentalists are slightly more to the right (5.73) than the non-IG 
group (5.46), and the same is true for socio-cultural beliefs (3.87 for IGs, 3.64 for non IGs). 
This echoes our earlier findings, which had shown supporters of the Community method to be 
slightly more pro-government and more libertarian than other officials (Dehousse and 
Thompson, 2012). In both cases, however, the difference is not significant. 
 
--Fig 6 and 7 about here – 
 
Whereas, on the whole, the impact of the left-right cleavage does not appear to be decisive, 
ideological concerns of another kind seems to have greater explanatory power. One of the 
questions in the EUCIQ survey related to the motivations that have led respondents to 
undertake a career in the European Commission. Whilst amongst the intergovernmentalists 53 
per cent made reference to a commitment to Europe as a major motivation, the percentage 
climbed to 73 for the non-IG group
7
.  
 By building these various possible explanations of support for intergovernmentalism 
into a multivariate analysis using binary logistic multi-level modelling of individuals nested 
within countries, we are able to identify the key variables. In a previous analysis we used the 
country-level predictor variables of multi-level governance and protestantism (proportion of 
the population), which were found to be correlated with support for the Community Method 
amongst Commission officials (Dehousse and Thompson, 2012). In the present case, the 
analysis shows that there is no discernible remaining variation between the countries.  This 
allows use of a binary logistic regression formulation instead, in which variables have been 
included in a hierarchical process of the individuals’ variables first, followed by the country 
variables.  This approach reveals the relative contribution of each level of variables to the 
explanation of the dependent variable (intergovernmentalism), as shown in the changes from 
model 1 to model 2 in Table 2. 
At the individual level, which offers about two-thirds of the explanation, the strongest 
predictor is commitment to Europe as a reason for joining the Commission, which reduces the 
odds of being an IG member by 57 per cent, holding all other variables constant.  Similarly, 
prior working in a national administration increases the odds of being an IG member by 67 
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per cent, although exhibiting low precision.  At the country level, the proportion of protestants 
provides the strongest (if imprecise) prediction, increasing the odds of being an IG member by 
almost two per cent amongst Commission officials for each percent increase in the national 
proportion, followed by the score on the index of multilevel governance, where for each scale 
point increase in the multi-level governance index, the odds of being an IG member decrease 
by 2 per cent. 
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Table 2 Personal and national characteristics supporting intergovernmentalism 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B 
(SE) 
Wald Odds ratio 
(95%CI) 
B 
(SE) 
Wald Odds ratio 
(95%CI) 
 
Personal 
      
Commitment 
to Europe 
(ref cat: no) 
-0.926 
(0.168) 
30.43*** 0.396 
(0.285:0.551) 
-0.842 
(0.171) 
24.177*** 0.431 
(0.308:0.603) 
Previous 
career in 
national civil 
service 
(ref cat: no) 
0.629 
(0.167) 
14.13*** 1.876 
(1.351:2.604) 
0.515 
(0.171) 
9.134** 1.674 
(1.199:2.339) 
 
National 
 
      
Protestantism 
(proportion) 
   1.082 
(0.275) 
15.444*** 2.950 
(1.720:5.059) 
Index of 
multi-level 
governance 
   -0.020 
(0.010) 
4.503* 0.980 
(0.961:0.998) 
Reduction in -
2LL 
43.79***   64.82***   
Nagelkerke R² 0.052   0.076   
Hosmer and 
Lemeshow 
test (sig) 
0.863   0.888   
n 
(unweighted) 
1901   1901   
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05 
 
3. Integovernmentalist Views on Integration 
 
 Adopting a different perspective, we then attempted to identify to what extent a self-
definition as an intergovernmentalist affects the views of the officials in question. Do 
members of our IG group hold different views from other officials on the evolution of the 
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Union? What is their assessment of the impact of enlargement, or that of the Kinnock reforms, 
on the functioning of the Commisison?  Secondly, what preferences do they have as regards 
the future of the EU? What is, according to them, the most desirable distribution of authority 
between the EU and its member states or between the institutions?  In answering these and 
related questions, we now consider support for intergovernmentalism as the independent 
variable to see how well it explains differences in attitude or belief. 
 
A) Power Change in the Union 
 
 From the outset, clear differences appear in the two groups’ vision of the evolution of 
the Union. Whereas almost three quarters of the non-IG group (74.8 per cent) disagree 
strongly or tend to disagree with the idea that the Commission is stronger today than ever 
before, the same percentage goes down to 55.5 for intergovermentalists
8
. As can be seen in 
Figure 8, those who see the Commission as having gained strength are twice as many in the 
latter group (15.3 per cent) as in the former (7.6 per cent). On the whole, the Commission 
appears stronger (or at least less weak) in the eyes of IGs. 
 
-- FIG 8 ABOUT HERE – 
 
Asked to whom the Commission might have lost power, the two groups diverge again. 
Whereas almost two thirds of the non-IGs believe it has lost ground to the national capitals, 
this view is supported by 47.3 percent of intergovernmentalists only
9
 (Figure 9). In contrast, 
there is no major difference as regards the European Parliament, which is viewed by both 
groups as having gained political clout
10
. 
 
- FIG 9 ABOUT HERE – 
 
 
 
What are the elements which are deemed to be linked to this evolution? We explored 
three types of factors which might have affected the Commission’s position in the EU 
institutional setting: enlargement, which has long been expected to complicate relations with 
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the Council as well as the internal organization of the Commission; administrative reform, 
often described as imposed on the institution, and changes in the Commission leadership. 
 
The EUCIQ survey has found that enlargement is regarded as a disruptive element by 
a majority of officials: about three quarters of the respondents agree that a 27 member college 
makes coordination more difficult. There was no major disagreement between the supporters 
of the Community method and intergovernmentalists (73 per cent in agreement)
 11
 on this 
assessment.  Likewise, over 60 per cent of our total sample held that enlargement weakened 
the esprit de corps within the Commission, or that its consequences on officials’ career 
development were not handled equitably.  Once again, the IG group are barely different over 
this issue, with 58 per cent of this opinion
12
. 
Concerning administrative reform, our respondents are fairly critical of what has been 
achieved. While they are fairly uncertain as regards the impact of recent reforms, only 
minorities appear convinced that they (23.3 per cent) or their unit (29.2 per cent) have become 
more efficient.  Negative assessments tend to dominate: personnel management has not 
improved (49.7 per cent); resources are not better matched to policy priorities (48.0 per cent); 
almost two thirds of our respondents consider that the new tools have been applied in a 
formalistic way and over 70  per cent that they have led to more red tape. There is only one 
point, the situation of women, where there is a clear majority (58.2 per cent) who believe that 
the situation has been improved.  But there are no major differences between IGs and non-IGs 
in relation to those issues. In other words, their assessment of the Commission’s loss of 
authority does not seem to have been prompted by their view of the recent administrative 
reforms. 
 
Finally, we analyzed respondents’ appraisal of the performance of various presidents 
and we observe clear differences of opinion at this level. The Santer and Prodi Commission 
came in for the most criticism, arguing that they were weak in relation to setting policy 
agendas, managing the “house” effectively and defending the Commission in the EU system . 
While there was no major difference between our two groups, the situation is different as 
regards the Barroso I Commission: 45 per cent of the non-IG group (47 per cent for 
supporters of the Community method)  were of the opinion that it was fairly or very weak in 
defending the Commission in the EU system, an assessment that was shared by fewer than 30 
per cent of intergovernmentalists
13
 (Figure 10).  In contrast, both groups concur on a more 
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balanced assessment of its ability to effectively manage the Commission or to set the Union’s 
political agenda.  
 
Fig 10 about here 
 
Interestingly, while there is an overwhelming positive assessment of the Delors 
Commission, the IG group are less sanguine about this Commission defending the 
Commission in Europe (10 per cent) than the non-IG group (2 percent)
14
. 
 
B) Views about the Future 
Intergovernmentalism being one vision of how the EU system should operate, it would 
make sense to expect its supporters to hold distinct views as to how European governance 
should evolve in the future. However, reality appears to be somewhat more complex. First, 
contrary to what one might think, our intergovermentalists are not adverse to the idea of 
further transfers of powers to the EU level. Asked to locate their desired distribution of 
authority on a ten point scale between the member states (0) and the Union (10), they appear 
to agree with non-IGs on the hierarchy of priorities, with  competition, trade, agriculture and 
the environment appearing as EU competences par excellence. More surprisingly, they 
indicate that they would welcome further transfers of authority to the European level in 
several areas (with the notable exception of agriculture where, like an overwhelming majority 
of Commission officials, they would favour a degree of decentralization). As can be seen in 
Figure 11, they would even be prepared to accept a stronger European role in areas 
traditionally regarded as key aspects of state sovereignty such as social policy or foreign and 
security policy. It is worthy of note that in every single policy area, the support for 
Europeanization is significantly lower among IGs than among other officials.
15
  However, 
when considering the difference between actual and desired authority, there are no discernible 
gaps in relation to competition or trade.  The maximum differences are of 1.24 scale points for 
foreign and security policies,
16
 1.22 points for social policy 
17
 and 1.13 points for police and 
judicial cooperation
18
 .   
 
Figure 11 about here 
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Intergovernmentalists also have a distinct view on EU governance. Unlike other 
officials, who are fairly divided on this issue, they are resolutely opposed to the idea that the 
Commission should one day become the government of Europe: as shown in Figure 12, 76.1 
per cent of them declare to be opposed to this evolution (against 39.4 percent in the non-IG 
group).  
 
-- Figure 12 about here – 
 
However, there is a weak adherence to a vision of the Commission as mere faithful servants of 
national interests: 60.3 per cent of IG respondents reject the idea of having one commissioner per 
member state (against 67 per cent in the non-IG group)19 and an overwhelming majority (86 per cent) 
holds the view that services should support the politically-agreed positions of the college. Regarding 
state-based considerations, there is not a significant difference between the groups over the need to 
distribute posts on a geographical basis, albeit IGs showing more support for the idea, with 42.8 per 
cent of IGs agreeing, against 34.9 per cent of the others20.  Managing dossiers of special interest to an 
official’s country does show more concern from IGs, with 42.3 per cent feeling it is problematic 
against 32.4 per cent of the others, although it is marginally insignificant21.   
 
 Finally, their support for states’ leadership does not lead Commission intergovernmentalists 
into a view of a reduced importance of the Commission. Some 60 per cent of them (59.5 per cent of 
IGs, against 65.7 for the non-IG group) are of the opinion that enlargement has increased the 
importance of the Commission’s role in policy initiation. Nor are they more opposed than other 
Commission officials to the idea of sharing legislative initiative with the European Parliament. Figure 
13 shows that there is only a marginal difference between our two groups on this issue, with 
more difference being displayed within each group. On the whole, opposition prevails, which 
can probably be attributed to the central importance attached to the Commission’s right of 
initiative in the dominant discourse on EU policy-making. 
 
Figure 13 about here 
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Conclusion: Foxes in the Henhouse? 
 
Our survey has brought to the fore the existence within the European Commission of a 
sizeable group of officials whose views are closer to a standard intergovernmentalist view on 
integration than to the official, pro-Community method, discourse of the institution. Like all 
intergovernmentalists, those officials are eager to preserve states’ leadership and powers in 
the Union and they appear reluctant to see the Commission’s role further enhanced (though 
not necessarily to a stronger Union presence in several areas). They can be found in nearly 
every directorate-general, at all levels of the hierarchy, and the coherence of the views they 
defend makes it unlikely that our cluster is a mere statistical artefact. This finding, like those 
of other contributions to this special issue, warns us against the dangers of monolithic 
readings of institutions’ preferences. Almost unavoidably, alternative worldviews and 
political preferences can be expected to co-exist in large organizations such as the 
Commission. 
 
At a broader political level, what is the meaning of the presence, within an institution 
that was long regarded as the ‘engine of integration’, of a group committed to preserve states’ 
rights and influence, in a period characterized by a relative weakness of the Commission and 
a strong assertiveness on the side of national capitals (Puetter, 2011)?.  
 
Two considerations seem to be in order here. First, given the absence of points of 
comparison, it is impossible to document whether, and to what extent, support for 
intergovernmentalism has evolved with the decline of the Commission in the post-Maastricht 
years. However, our data on enlargement strongly suggest it is not a novel feature: as shown 
in Figure 3, as far as intergovernmentalism is concerned, the most relevant enlargement was 
that to the British Isles and Denmark in 1973.. Said otherwise, there is no evidence of a 
significant growth in the number of intergovernmentalists in the Commission. 
Secondly, in many respects, the group of officials covered by our survey is remarkable 
in its hybrid character. Its members tend to be less critical of the situation of the Commission 
and less severe with the current leadership than supporters of the Community method, 
possibly because the current situation is closer to their ideal . At the same time, their concern 
for member states’ rights notwithstanding, Commission intergovernmentalists’ views appear 
informed by their activity within a supranational institution. They are concerned about their 
institution’s autonomy with respect to national capitals and willing to contemplate further 
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transfers of authority to the EU, even across ‘red lines’ drawn by some governments in areas 
like social policy or security policy. Thus, to the extent that they may be regarded as foxes in 
the henhouse, it is far from sure that they will get along well with other foxes in national 
capitals. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Nationality of intergovernmentalists 
 
 
 
 
NB  n=1822, with n≥18 for each nationality (except Luxembourg, n=6). The vertical bars represent the mean 
value by nationality and the error bars the 95 percent confidence intervals. The lighter coloured bars at the lower 
end highlight which nationalities have support profiles that differ significantly below that of the overall mean, 
while the darker bar at the upper end reflects the nationality above the overall mean.  The overall mean is shown 
by the central horizontal line, with the 95per cent confidence interval either side. 
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Figure 2. Impact of successive enlargements 
 
Fi 
 
 
 
 
 
NB  n=1824. The vertical bars represent the mean value by date of accession and the error bars the 95 percent 
confidence intervals. The lighter coloured bar highlights which accession wave has a support profiles that differs 
significantly below that of the overall mean, while the darker bar reflects the accession wave with a support 
profile above the overall mean.  The overall mean is shown by the central horizontal line, with the 95 per cent 
confidence interval either side. 
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Figure 3. Intergovernmentalists in Commission directorate-Generals 
 
 
 
 
 
NB  n=1654, excluding n<12 for any DG.  The vertical bars represent the mean value by DG and the error bars 
the 95 percent confidence intervals. The lighter coloured bars at the lower end highlights the DG which have 
support profiles that are significantly lower than that of the overall mean   . The overall mean is shown by the 
central horizontal line, with the 95 per cent confidence interval either side. 
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Figure 4. Intergovernmentalism and Seniority 
 
 
 
NB  n=1846. The vertical bars represent the mean value by level of seniority and the error bars the 95 percent 
confidence intervals.  The overall mean is shown by the central horizontal line, with the 95 per cent confidence 
interval either side. 
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Figure 5.  Intergovenmentalism and Age 
 
 
 
NB  n=1810. The vertical bars represent the mean value by age-group and the error bars the 95 percent 
confidence intervals.  The overall mean is shown by the central horizontal line, with the 95 per cent confidence 
interval either side. 
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Figure 6. Intergovernmentalism and Economic Policy 
 
 
 
NB  n=1784.  The vertical bars represent the percentage at each scale point from 0 (a greater role for 
government) to 10 (a greater role for markets) and the error bars the 95 percent confidence intervals. 
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Figure 7. Intergovernmentalism and Socio-cultural Beliefs 
 
 
 
NB  n=1785.  The vertical bars represent the percentage at each scale point from 0 (more liberal) to 10 (more 
conservative) and the error bars the 95 percent confidence intervals. 
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Figure 8. Has the Commission Gained Strength? 
 
 
n = 1519 
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Figure 9. Has the Commission lost power to national capitals? 
 
 
n= 1524 
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Figure 10. The Performance of the Barroso Commission in Defending the Commission 
 
 
n=1498 
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Figure 11. Desired Changes in the allocation of Authority 
 
 
1574≤n≤1624
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Figure 12. Support for the Commission as Government of the EU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
n=1718 
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Figure 13. Need to share legislative initiative with the European Parliament 
 
 
 
 
n=1752
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Endnotes 
 
                                                            
1 This presentation draws on data collected as part of ‘The European Commission in Question’, funded by the 
ESRC (grant no. RES-062-23-1188) and conducted by Michael Bauer, Sara Connolly, Renaud Dehousse, 
Liesbet Hooghe, Hussein Kassim, John Peterson, and Andrew Thompson. For further information, visit 
http://www.uea.ac.uk/psi/research/EUCIQ. 
 
2 In addition to the present authors, the research team included  Hussein Kassim (Norwich), John Peterson 
(Edinburgh), Michael Bauer (Berlin), Sara Connolly (Norwich) and Liesbet Hooghe (Chapel Hill and 
Amsterdam). See Kassim et al.(2012) for an overview of the project’s findings. 
3 The data were weighted to reflect the true population proportions within the Commission, based on seniority, 
gender, age/length of service, nationality, EU15/EU12 countries and DGs, using iterative proportional fitting. 
4 p=0.007. 
5Spearman’s rho=+0.073.  
6 p<0.001; phi=0.08 
7 p<0.001; phi=0.118 
8 p<0.001; Cramer’s V = 0.124 
9 p<0.001; Cramer’s V = 0.127 
10 p=0.484 
11 p=0.226 
12 p=0.217 
13 p=0.004; Cramer’s V= 0.086 
14 p=0.006; Cramer’s V = 0.006 
15 p<0.001 for every area, except environmental policy (p<0.01). 
16 95%CI: 0.73 : 1.74. 
17 95%CI: 0.81 : 1.62. 
18 95%CI: 0.63 : 1.57 
19 p=0.034; Cramer’s V = 0.079 
20 p=0.211 
21 p=0.068; Cramer’s V = 0.072 
